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I. INTRODUCTION
In the years 1958 and 1960, the United States and Canada were
among 88 nations engaged in negotiations on the law of the sea.
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea began
in December 1973, met again in Caracas in June-August 1974 and
is to continue in 1975. The United States and Canada are among
138 nations taking part in efforts to reach agreement on an interna-
tional treaty governing the use of an area comprising 70 percent
of the earth's surface. In this international lawmaking exercise,
the governments of Canada and the U.S. play very active roles.
The Law of the Sea Conferences-past and present-provide a
convenient framework for examining changes in U.S.-Canadian re-
lations in law of the sea. To understand the political processes in-
volved, three perspectives are useful: (1) the state centered model,
(2) the bureaucratic politics approach, and (3) the transnational
systems perspective.
With the passage of Canada's Arctic Waters Pollution Bill and
related legislation in 1970, law of the sea became highly politicized
* Dr. Hollick is the Executive Director of the Ocean Policy Project at
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in both countries. In Ottawa the issue was cast as one of national
sovereignty, whereas in Washington the issue was perceived as one
of national security. The behavior of both governments in this con-
troversy is best explained by means of the concept of government
as a unitary actor.
Within the Canadian Government, law of the sea policy has been
formulated and implemented through a highly centralized foreign
affairs bureaucracy. This may be explained in terms of the political
salience of law of the sea, of the parliamentary system, of the small
size of the Canadian bureaucracy and of the preponderance of in-
terests tending in a single direction. An appreciation of bureau-
cratic politics, however, is necessary to explain the diffusion of pow-
er, the conflicting interests and the resulting decision-making proc-
ess behind U.S. law of the sea policy.
The existence of a variety of private and governmental interests
that are not easily reconcilable by the foreign policy organs of gov-
ernment provides an opportunity for transnational and transgov-
ernmental relations1 to flourish. Indeed, this was the case between
the U.S. and Canadian governments duriig 1958 and 1960 in defense
areas and during the period up to 1970 in -resource questions. With
the politicization and exacerbation of law of the sea relations in
1970, transnational contacts diminished. Since then the policies of
both governments have converged in several respects. Resource
considerations have been given greater weight in U.S. policies and
led to acceptance of a 200-mile economic zone in 1974. In Canada,
non-coastal interests in navigation and deep sea mining have been
increasingly vocal. Although transnational and transgovernmental
relations may therefore increase, the political- salience of the issue
in Canada together with Canada's centralized decision-making proc-
ess, will limit the scope of such interactions.
II. LAW OF THE SEA IssUES AD NATIONAL
PoLIcIEs: 1970-1975
Before considering the history of U.S.-Canadian law of the sea
relations from 1958 to 1970, it is useful to review the several issue
1. Transgovernmental relations are those between government officials
not normally responsible for the conduct of foreign policy, while transna-
tional relations may involve private actors as well. Intergovernmental re-
lations refers to interactions between the central foreign policy-making or-
gans of governments.
areas that are encompassed within the negotiations on law of the
sea-naval and commercial mobility, jurisdiction over the petro-
leum resources of the continental margin, marine science research,
protection of the marine environment, fisheries and the deep seabed
regime. Canadian and U.S. interests and policies diverge on some
of these questions and not on others. While there are periodic in-
tergovernmental consultations, present policies appear to be form-
ulated primarily in response to domestic interests and secondarily
to prevailing views in the international negotiation rather than
through close Canadian-U.S. cooperation.
The United States is a major maritime power with what it per-
ceives to be global interests. Despite the politics of detente, the
Government places high priority on its deterrence strategy and on
U.S. naval mobility to facilitate that strategy. Although the U.S.
lacks an extensive commercial fleet operating under its flag, it is
a major trading nation and is particularly dependent-at least for
the next half decade-on increasing imports of petroleum. In addi-
tion to protection of shipping lanes, naval mobility to determine
local conflicts is another aspect of the perceived U.S. interest in
maintaining order. The U.S. claims a three-mile territorial sea, and
in the law of the sea negotiations of 1958 and 1960 as well as in
the present negotiations, the Government has sought international
agreement on narrow territorial sea limits. In response to resource
considerations, the U.S. in 1974 indicated its willingness to accept
a 200-mile economic zone as part of a law of the sea treaty.2 The
present official position is that the U.S. will accept a twelve-mile
territorial sea if unimpeded passage through and over all interna-
tional straits is guaranteed. With regard to the economic zone, the
U.S. insists that there be no unjustifiable interference with the high
seas rights of navigation and overflight.
Canada has neither an extensive merchant fleet nor a large navy
although it is a major trading nation and 25 percent of its exports
were carried in seagoing ships in 1972. At the end of the Second
World War, Canada had the fourth largest merchant fleet in the
world. Canada cooperated closely with the United States at the
1958 and 1960 Conferences in rallying support for agreement on nar-
row territorial seas. As late as 1967 Canada's reaction to an eco-
nomic zone was to stress the principle of "non-interference with
the freedom of the high seas, subject to the strict requirements es-
2. United States: Draft Articles for a Chapter on the Economic Zone
and the Continental Shelf, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.47 (1974); United
States: Draft Article for Inclusion in a Chapter on the High Seas, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/C.2/L.79 (1974).
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sential for effective exploitation."3  In 1970, however, Canada
extended her own territorial sea to twelve miles and established
pollution control zones and extensive fishing zones despite U.S. pro-
tests. Furthermore, Canada has indicated her support for the
regime of innocent passage in all straits thus covered by twelve-
mile territorial seas, taking special pains to note that the Northwest
Passage is not an international strait.4 The shift in Canadian atti-
tudes toward navigation mirrors the reduction in Canada's mer-
chant fleet and the change in defense considerations from NATO
concerns to those of hemispheric defense. Now that technology has
facilitated man's use of the Arctic, Canadian notions of defense have
gone beyond strictly military to embrace environmental considera-
tions. Within its economic zone as well as international straits, the
Canadian Government would qualify the right of navigation by the
right of the coastal State to protect its environment through a
variety of mechanisms. 5 There is less than complete unanimity on
this policy and shipping interests have openly taken issue with this
approach. They have argued that technology will increase Canada's
shipping capacity and that the government therefore "should only
claim such limited jurisdiction over what is now high seas as we
are prepared to see other nations exercise."
' 6
The United States has substantial coastal as well as maritime in-
terests-the fourth longest coastline in the world, 863,000 square
nautical miles of continental margins7 and abundant offshore re-
sources. Offshore reserves of petroleum are estimated at 1,400 bil-
lion barrels of oil and 3,230 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.8 U.S.
3. Allen Gotlieb, Statement in First Committee, United Nations General
Assembly, Press Release No. 77 (Nov. 15, 1967).
4. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Paper Sub-
mitted by the Government in the House (Nov. 2, 1973).
5. Canada, Fiji, Ghana, Guyana, Iceland, India, Iran, New Zealand,
Philippines, Spain: Draft Articles on Zonal Approach to the Preservation
of the Marine Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.3/L.6 (1974).
6. M&RINE LEGIsLATIox BRANCH, MIuIsITRy OF TRANsPORT, Third Law of
the Sea Conference: Working Paper No. 3, Delivered at Dalhousie Uni-
versity, Fall, 1974.
7. OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER, BuREAu OF INTELLIGENCE AX RESEARCH,
U.S. DEm"T or STATE, Lnrrs IN THE SEAS, No. 46 (Aug. 12, 1972). The con-
tinental margin is the submerged prolongation of continents and includes
the continental shelf, slope and rise.
8. D. KASH, et al. ENERGY UNDER THE OCEANS: A TECHNOLOGY ASSESS-
mExT or OUTER CONTnENTAL SHELF Oi A D GAS OPERAziONs (NATrONAL
SCIENCE FOUND. 1973).
policy with regard to the petroleum resources of the continental
margin has been characterized by the extension of national jurisdic-
tion, with a sharp reversal in 1970 and a subsequent return to the
policy of expanding jurisdiction. In the 1945 Truman Proclamation,
the United States laid claim to the resources of its continental shelf.
Then in 1958, the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf es-
tablished coastal State sovereignty over seabed resources to a depth
of 200 meters or beyond that point to the depth admitting of ex-
ploitability. This remained official U.S. policy until May 1970 when
the United States announced support for a policy renouncing na-
tional claims to seabed resources beyond the 200 meter isobath and
calling for the establishment, beyond this point, of an international
regime to govern the exploitation of seabed resources. Behind this
policy reversal was a bureaucratic struggle and the temporary vic-
tory of strategic over resource interests. Since 1970, the U.S. posi-
tion on the intermediate zone of coastal State authority has, in re-
sponse to increased concern with resource scarcities, gradually re-
verted to favor expanded coastal State jurisdiction. Tn July, 1973,
the U.S. submitted draft proposals for a Coastal Seabed Economic
Area, of undetermined width, in which the coastal State would en-
joy exclusive rights fto seabed resources. Included in this proposal
were five international features: no unjustifiable interference with
other uses of the area, international pollution standards, guarantee
of investments, compulsory settlement of disputes, and revenue
sharing. When the U.S. adopted the concept of a 200-mile economic
zone in 1974, it continued to claim sovereignty over resources to
the outer edge of the continental margin where it extends beyond
200 miles.
Canada has the second largest continental margin in the world,
after the Soviet Union, comprising a total area of almost 2 million
square miles.9 Resource potential off Canadian shores is estimated
at 59.6 billion barrels of recoverable oil and 457.2 trillion cubic feet
of recoverable gas.10 Canada's preoccupation with its offshore con-
tinental margin is relatively recent but is now a strongly held in-
terest. For legal confirmation of its rights to the entire continental
margin, Canada points to the 1958 Convention on the Continental
Shelf (which it ratified as late as March 1970) and to the 1969 deci-
sions of the International Court of Justice regarding the North Sea
9. D.G. Crosby, How Far Offshore? GEos, Winter 1973.
10. Offshore drilling to the end of 1973 was insufficient to estimate re-
serves. Of 80 holes off the East Coast, no commercial oil or gas field was
definitely confirmed. CANADA, HousE OF Co'.nvoNs STANDING CoMInvTIim
ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL DEFENCE, MINuTEs OF PROCEEDINGS AND
EVIDENCE No. 27, at 39, 82 (Dec. 12, 1973).
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Continental Shelf. In addition the Canadian Government has is-
sued exploration permits in extensive offshore areas 1 and has as-
serted its claim to the continental margin both in its Parliament
and at the United Nations. With 320,000 square miles of margin
lying beyond a 200-mile resource 'zone, Canada has been more active
than the United States at the Law of the Sea Conference in pressing
for a policy of coastal State jurisdiction to the outer edge of the
continental margin where it extends beyond the zone. In the Cana-
dian case the margin stretches to distances of more than 400 miles
from shore.
Although the U.S. and Canada have both adopted the concept
of a 200-mile zone and claim the margin beyond, significant differ-
ences remain over the nature of coastal State jurisdiction to
be exercised in the zone-particularly in the areas of marine scien-
tific research and pollution control. Scientific communities in both
Canada and the U.S. share similar levels of expertise and interests
in carrying out research unfettered by coastal State restrictions.
In neither country, however, does the marine scientist enjoy a signi-
ficant degree of political power to allow a major input into national
ocean policy. Nevertheless, thanks to the support for unfettered
navigation and scientific research by stronger actors within the
U.S., United States policy has consistently favored freedom of ma-
rine science research beyond the territorial sea with prior notifica-
tion to the coastal State. The Canadian position has been that
much research is conducted for economic and military reasons and
therefore the coastal State must have the right to control and, when
necessary, prohibit research activities in the economic zone and
on the continental margin. With regard to conduct of research, the
U.S. and Canada support similar provisions for the coastal State
right of participation, access to data and samples, and open publica-
tion of research results.
The second area of divergence with regard to the economic zone
concerns the rights of coastal States to set and enforce environ-
mental standards stricter than those internationally agreed. This
particularly intractable issue was raised in 1970 with the passage
of the Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act. Viewing
11. Three holes were drilled in ,1966 and 1967 but continuous year round
drilling only began in the fall of 1969. D.F. Sherwin, Seafaring Oil Drillers,
GE0S. Winter 1973.
the Act as an adverse precedent for high seas navigation, the United
States strongly opposed this legislation and evolved in response a
policy of exclusive international standards beyond the territorial
sea under which the right to set standards for vessel source pollution
would be vested in IMCO, with coastal State enforcement of these
standards limited to the territorial sea, and flag State and port
State enforcement of violations occurring beyond. The flag and
port States would have the right to establish and enforce supple-
mental regulations. Emergency coastal State enforcement beyond
the territorial sea would be allowed only to prevent imminent
harmful damage.12 Canada, on the other hand, has linked the con-
cept of coastal State pollution jurisdiction to resource jurisdiction.
Indeed, below the 600 latitude, pollution zones established in 1970
were those areas encompassed within "fishery closing lines."' 8
Within areas under coastal State economic jurisdiction (including
the continental margin as well as the zone), Canada supports the
right of the coastal State to adopt and enforce environmental pro-
tection standards over and above internationally agreed standards
including measures relating to the prevention of accidents, safety
of operations at sea, design of equipment, and operation and main-
tenance of vessels.
14
The area in which Canadian-American interests have been simi-
lar, albeit ruffled by bilateral disputes, is fisheries. The species in-
habiting offshore waters of both nations are some of the most val-
uable in the world. In the past decade, coastal fisheries have been
seriously depleted by the distant water fleets of Japan and Russia
and strong domestic pressure has been building to extend national
fishing jurisdiction. U.S. and Canadian distant water fishing inter-
ests are presently limited to tuna fleets operating out of San Diego
and New Brunswick respectively. Although fishing represents a
small and declining portion of GNP in both countries (one percent
in Canada and less than a half percent in the U.S.), the fishing
interest exercises a large influence in state or provincial govern-
ments and ultimately in the legislative branches of both federal
governments due to the concentration of voting strength in several
coastal regions.15
12. United States: Draft Articles on the Protection of the Marine En-
vironment and the Prevention of Marine Pollution, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/
SC.III/L.40 (1973).
13. In the Arctic areas above 600 latitude, uniform pollution zones of
100 miles were put into effect.
14. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.3/L.6 (1974).
15. In Canada, with a population of 22 million, 80,000 people were em-
ployed in fishing operations and another 16,000 in processing in 1972.
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In response to similar problems, Canada and the United States
initially adopted a species approach providing for separate manage-
ment schemes for coastal, anadromous and highly migratory spe-
cies.' 6 Coastal species would be exclusively managed by the coastal
State which would determine quotas and would enjoy a preferential
share of the catch. Anadromous species, spawning in fresh water,
would be reserved exclusively to the country of origin. Highly mi-
gratory species would be exempt from coastal State jurisdiction.
The species approach was subsequently adapted to the concept of
a 200-mile resource zone, first by Canada in 1972, and then by the
U.S. in 1974. In this new policy, both countries would claim ex-
clusive coastal State rights to fisheries within 200 miles of shore,
allowing foreign nationals to fish for the unutilized portion of the
stock. In addition, Canada claims preferential coastal State rights
to fisheries beyond 200 miles.17
A foremost consideration in U.S. and Canadian policies toward
an international seabed regime beyond the limits of national juris-
diction is the domestic supply and demand for constituent metals
of the manganese nodules scattered about the ocean floor. These
include nickel, copper, cobalt and manganese. The United States
is a net importer of each of these minerals. In 1973, the United
States imported 82 percent of its manganese, 95 percent of its cobalt,
65 percent of its nickel, and 5 percent of its copper."" These con-
siderations have only recently begun to weigh heavily in the deter-
mination of U.S. seabed policy, due to intra-governmental trade-offs
of resource for strategic interests and to the absence until 1973 of
a strong seabed mining constituency. In August, 1970, the U,S.
tabled a Draft Treaty 9 proposing international machinery em-
powered to issue leases for seabed mineral exploitation on a first
come first served basis. This was supplemented by proposals at
Caracas. In general U.S. policy urges low royalties, work require-
16. Sedentary species are covered by the Convention on the Continental
Shelf.
17. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Paper Sub-
mitted by the Government in the House 12-13 (Nov. 2, 1973).
18. U.S., CouNcnL ON INTERNATIONAL EcoNovIxIc PoLIcy, SPEcIAL REPORT:
CRmcAL IaPORTED MATEIALs (December 1974). The figures given reflect
net imports as percentage of consumption. Gross imports would be some-
what higher.
19. Draft United Nations Convention on the International Seabed Area,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/25 (1970).
ments and other features designed to spur seabed mineral produc-
tions and discounts the possibility of any major economic disloca-
tions resulting from seabed mineral production.2"
Of the constituent metals of deep sea nodules, Canada is a net
importer of manganese only (valued at $5 million in 1972). Canada
ranks fifth in world mineral production and produces 38.1 percent
of world nickel, 10.7 percent of world copper and 7.5 percent of
world cobalt.21 Canadian interests in deep sea mining are twofold.
As a technologically advanced country, Canadian firms will be
among those mining for manganese nodules.2 2 As a major producer
and exporter of nickel, however, Canda seeks protection against
"any undesirable effects that a substantial increase in production
of minerals could have on our position at home."23 In the U.N. Sea-
bed Committee, Canada initially proposed a licensing system which
included production controls, marketing and distribution mech-
anisms.2 4 Subsequently, Canada has sought an approach that would
combine the Canadian with the "Enterprise System" supported by
a large number of developing and mineral producing nations. In
this scheme Canada has suggested a mix of licensing and direct ex-
ploration and exploitation by the Authority, when it acquires the
requisite means. At the Caracas session of the Law of the Sea Con-
ference, Canada submitted no draft proposals on deep sea mining.
This may reflect a preoccupation with other areas of law of the
sea or it may presage a lower Canadian profile on an international
seabed regime. Newly articulated industry interests in deep seabed
mining could either lead to Canadian proposals along the lines of
the U.S. and other developed country proposals or to official silence
while transnational industry contacts develop and exploration pro-
ceeds.
20. United States: Working Paper on the Economic Effects of Deep Sea-
bed Exploitation, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1/L.5 (1974); United States:
Draft Appendix to the Law of the Sea Treaty Concerning Mineral Resource
Development in the International Seabed Area, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/
C.1/L.6 (1974).
21. Canada ranks in terms of world production first in nickel, and third
in copper and cobalt production. Figures derived from: CANADA, DEPART-
Er or ENERwy, MINES AN REsouncEs, TAE CANADIAN EcoNomy AND
MnmaI INDUSTRY IN 1973 (1974).
22. Statement of Noranda Mine* Limited, CANADA, HOUSE OF tOMMONS
STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL ArrAnis AND NATIONAL DErENSE, MIN-
UTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE No. 16, at 34 ff (May 7, 1974).
23. CA ADA, HOUSE OF CoaMMONS STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AY-
FAIRS AND NATIONAL DEFENSE, MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE No.
27, at 48 (Dec. 12, 1973).
24. International Sea-bed Regime and Machinery Working Paper Sub-
mitted by the Delegation of Canada, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/59 (1971).
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III. LOS RELATIONS: 1958 TO 1970
The past five years have witnessed a rapid development of U.S.
and Canadian ocean interests and a number of shifts in their re-
spective law of the sea policies. Reviewing governmental inter-
actions from the First U.N. Conference on Law of the Sea highlights
the discontinuity between the past five years and the previous dec-
ade. Relations between U.S. and Canadian officials in law of the
sea were close in 1960, were plagued by minor irritations after 1962
and became openly hostile in 1970. Since then, there has been a
gradual warming trend between the countries as U.S. policy has
shifted to a greater emphasis on resource considerations and as new
non-coastal interests have been heard in Ottawa. While similar in-
terests on both sides of the border may strengthen transnational
ties, distance between government representatives will doubtless be
maintained. Canadian officials will, at least for the indefinite fu-
ture, continue to pursue a diplomatic role at the LOS (Law of the
Sea) Conference independent of the U.S. and closely linked to other
middle range powers. Canadian efforts to exercise a leadership and
compromiser role vis-a-vis the less developed countries will of
necessity diminish.
The First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea cul-
minated eight years of detailed preparatory work by the Interna-
tional Law Commission. Within the brief span of the eight-week
session, the 88 participating nations were therefore able to reach
agreement on four Conventions-on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone, on the High Seas, on the Continental Shelf, and
on Fisheries and Conservation of Living Resources. These Conven-
tions were not uniformly successful in resolving rapidly evolving
ocean problems. While the Continental Shelf Convention put to
rest, at least for the short term, the issue of coastal State control
over seabed resources, agreement on the breadth of the territorial
sea was not possible within the scope of the Convention on the Ter-
ritorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.25 Due to this failure, a Second
U.N. Law of the Sea Conference was convened two years later.
At both Conferences, the Canadian and American Governments,
as well as the British and Australian, found their interests in har-
25. Article 24 of the Convention did provide that "the contiguous zone
may not extend beyond twelve miles from the baseline from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured."
mony and their relations cordial. The concern of NATO members
in particular was with strategic mobility and access through straits
in the event of a conventional Soviet attack and the need to trans-
port troops quickly to Europe. Despite growing skepticism about
a war of mobilization as opposed to one of nuclear exchange, Can-
ada publicly supported the U.S. position on strategic needs. Indeed,
through close cooperation with and influence on the United States
delegation, Canadian officials maximized Canadian influence in the
1960 deliberations. 26  Canadian and American defense establish-
ments were in regular contact and U.S. military briefings of the
Canadian delegation were not uncommon. In 1958, the United
States could not be persuaded to abandon its insistence on limiting
the territorial sea to three miles. In 1960, however, the Canadian
delegation succeeded in persuading the United States Government
that a formula of a six mile territorial sea, with a six mile contigu-
ous zone, would not irreparably damage U.S. strategic needs. For
the remainder of the Conference, the two delegations worked
closely, as did the home governments, to sell the six plus six for-
mula to the participating nations. Despite the briet period of
lobbying, the formula came remarkably close to success-failing by
one vote of the required two-thirds majority.
With the failure to achieve universal agreement on a territorial
sea breadth, the United States reverted to its original position on
a three mile territorial sea. Canada, however, had been pursuing
the goal of a twelve mile fishing zone since the mid-1950's2' and
resolved to continue its efforts to round up support for the six plus
six formula. The United States indicated its interest in and willing-
ness to consider the findings of a multilateral effort, but did not
join in the worldwide canvass for support.28 The Australians as
well as the British played an active part in educating and seeking
the support of coastal nations for a six mile territorial sea. The
26. A widely accepted view among students of Canadian foreign policy
is that Canada pursued an "internationalist" approach in its foreign policy
prior to the Trudeau Government. Frustrated in its efforts to promote in-
ternational cooperation, Canada was required during the early Trudeau
years to reconsider its foreign policy and to evolve one that stressed the
national interest. A more plausible thesis is one that gives equal credit
to the Pearson and Diefenbaker Governments for pursuing the Canadian
national interest. That the national interest in one era might best be served
by active participation in international organizations and close relations
with the U.S., and in another era called for unilateral and even anti-Ameri-
can policies, simply reflects a changing international environment.
27. A.E. Gotlieb & C.M. Dalfen, National Jurisdiction and International
Responsibility: Canadian Approaches to International Law, First Annual
Conference of the Canadian Council on International Law, October 13, 1972.
28. Indeed, the U.S. undermined the effort, in Canadian eyes, by striking
bilateral fisheries agreements with countries such as Brazil and Mexico.
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Canadian pamphlet explaining the position (A Canadian Pro-
posal) was distributed to governments around the globe. By 1962,
44 nations were willing to accept the six plus six formula provided
that the U.S. and other major powers would agree.29 These find-
ings were presented to the United States Government. There was
no response for eight months. The reply, when it came, was nega-
tive-reflecting no doubt the U.S. preference for a universally ac-
cepted agreement as well as the abiding Defense Department con-
cern about the dangers of a broader territorial sea.
Interpreting the U.S. response as the rejection of the multilateral
approach, and having experienced the intractability of this issue
universally, the Canadians resorted to a unilateral solution of their
fisheries problem.3 0 On June 4, 1963 Prime Minister Pearson an-
nounced Canada's intention to draw straight baselines.3 1 Then in
July, 1964, Canada passed legislation 32 creating a nine mile fishing
zone beyond Canada's three mile territorial sea and empowering
the Government to draw straight baselines in place of the sinuosi-
ties of the coast as the starting point for measuring the breadth
of the territorial sea and fishing izones. The area landward of these
baselines would become internal waters.
The Department of State promptly protested the Canadian ex-
tension of jurisdiction, but only two years later the U.S. Congress
followed suit and passed legislation 33 for a fishing zone of nine
miles. U.S. legislation, however, made no provision for replacing
the contours of the coast with straight baselines and this soon be-
came a cause of friction between the two governments. While re-
ciprocal fishing rights were provided for nationals of both nations
in exclusive fishing zones, areas of internal waters were quite dif-
ferent-taking on the status of full coastal State sovereignty. Can-
ada approached the implementation of its new legislation cau-
29. Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada Ex-
tends its Territorial Sea, Statement to the House of Commons on April 17,
1970.
30. "... we really are not prepared, in light of these developments, to
accept the proposition that it is always desirable to proceed multilaterally
instead of unilaterally." Id. at 2.
31. 1 CAx. PArL,. DEB., H.C. 621 (1963).
32. An Act Respecting the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones of Canada,
1964, ch. 22.
33. Fisheries Zone Contiguous to the Territorial Sea of the United States,
16 U.S.C. §§ 1091-1094 (1966).
fiously. Nations traditionally fishing the area-Great Britain, Nor-
way, Denmark, France, Portugal, Spain and Italy-were allowed to
continue fishing in the new zone while negotiations were pursued.
In the 1966 negotiations between the legal offices of the Canadian
and U.S. foreign ministries, Canadian officials told their U.S. coun-
terparts that the Government was considering straight baselines
that would make the Gulf of St. Lawrence and parts of Queen Char-
lotte Sound internal waters. U.S. legal officials protested that some
baselines exceeded those permitted by international law and more-
over did not follow the general direction of the coast. Canadian
officials were told that the U.S. Government would have to protest
such Canadian action. To register U.S. concern, Under Secretary
Rostow headed a team to Ottawa in October, 1966 and President
Johnson spoke directly to Prime Minister Pearson.
Then in 1967, the Canadian Government announced the first ser-
ies of straight baselines along the coast of Labrador and the south-
ern and eastern coasts of Newfoundland. 4 The Canadians were
quick to point out the moderate nature of these claims and the fact
that the baselines did not close the Gulf of St. Lawrence. The base-
lines finally adopted by the Canadians were indeed more moderate
than those initially proposed to U.S. officials, allowing both sides
a measure of success. The U.S. did, as it had warned, protest the
baselines as inconsistent with international law.
Having once set out on the course of unilateral action and having
witnessed U.S. emulation of some aspects of that action in 1966,
the Canadian Government continued to press ahead in extending
offshore jurisdiction and in April, 1969 announced its intention to
draw further straight baselines along the east coast of Nova Scotia
and the west coast of Vancouver Island and the Queen Charlotte
Islands.35 In that same announcement, the Minister of Fisheries
indicated the Government's intention of closing several "gaps"
along the Canadian coast that were too extensive to be covered by
straight baselines. To put these areas out of reach of foreign fish-
ing without extending Canada's territorial sea, the concept of "fish-
eries closing lines" was adopted. These exclusive fishery zones up-
set the delicate U.S.-Canadian agreement reached in 1967, according
to which Canadian fishermen had preferential rights off the Cana-
dian coast in recognition of the coastal State's special interest.
34. Canada Privy Council, Order Respecting Geographical Coordinates of
Points from which Baselines may be determined Pursuant to the Territorial
Sea and Fishing Zones Act, October 26, 1967.
35. Those baselines went into effect in June of 1969. Canada Gazette,
June 11, 1969; Department of External Affairs, Law of the Sea, Press Re-
lease No. 34 (June 4, 1969).
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In 1970, when the fisheries closing lines were used for the first
time (across the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the Bay of Fundy, Queen
Charlotte Sound and Dixon Entrance) they were adopted in con-
junction with a series of measures aimed more or less directly at the
United States.36 The U.S.-Canadian fishery agreement negotiated in
February, 1970 anticipated the events of that year. While it con-
tinued to -provide for reciprocal fishing privileges, these reciprocal
rights extended to fewer stocks in fewer areas.31 A separate but re-
lated development in March of 1970 was consideration of a Bill (S-
5) to provide statutory authority, above and beyond the 1958 Con-
vention, to govern all aspects of oil and gas exploration and exploi-
tation, including pollution prevention and control, on Canada's en-
tire continental margin. The Act was designed to tie in with other
offshore mining legislation and to confirm Canada's wide-shelf sea-
bed resources position.
IV. LAW OF THE SEA BECOMES High Politics
Although law of the sea relations between Canada and the United
States had suffered minor setbacks beginning with the 1964 Cana-
dian Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, the politicization of law
of the sea relations occurred in 1969 and 1970. The dynamic of ac-
tion and reaction during this period is difficult to capture given
the number of overall pressures at work and the variety of issues
at stake. Within Canada, the Trudeau foreign policy review was
beginning. Deliberations in the U.N. Seabed Committee sustained
a constant pressure on both countries to formulate positions on law
of the sea. And finally, there were the direct confrontations-over
fisheries jurisdiction, over Canada's newly extended territorial sea
boundary, and over Canada's new claim to establish pollution safety
zones in the Arctic and other areas.
With the 1969 voyage of the Manhattan through the Northwest
Passage, the threat to Canadian jurisdiction over its Arctic areas
became explicit. While fisheries closing lines would obviously not
protect that jurisdiction, the establishment of a twelve mile ter-
ritorial sea, closing the Barrow Strait and Prince of Wales Strait
36. Canadian Fisheries Closing Lines Legislation, U.S. Dep't of State
Press Release No. 53 (Mar. 12, 1971).
37. Canada Drafts Agreement on Reciprocal Fishing Privileges, U.S.
Dep't of State Press Release No. 47 (Feb. 16, 1970).
would.38 In addition, a new type of authority was also needed, and
that was sought in the establishment of pollution prevention zones
of up to 100 nautical miles from land above the 60° parallel of north
latitude, and elsewhere to coincide with fisheries closing lines.89
The decisions regarding formulation and implementation of Cana-
dian policy were handled in the office of the Prime Minister with
legal counsel supplied by the Department of External Affairs. In
meetings with the Under Secretary of State and other U.S. officials,
Canadian representatives pointed to public pressure for immediate
Government action to protect the Arctic environment. The U.S.
requested, in response, that Canada delay, forego, or submit such
action to a multilateral conference. Such a unilateral claim, in the
U.S. view, would stimulate others to similar actions and thereby
damage prospects for international agreement safeguarding mari-
time mobility. For the Canadians, the issue came down to a ques-
tion of national sovereignty and for the Americans a question of
national security.
The public exchange between the governments on Canada's adop-
tion of the legislation showed the extreme importance that each
attached to Canada's pollution legislation. Taking issue with the
"unilateral" nature of Canada's claim, the United States asserted
that it "has long sought international solutions rather than national
approaches to problems involving the high seas," and offered to liti-
gate the issue in the International Court of Justice.40 Canada's re-
sponse was unequivocal. After stating that "Canada reserves to it-
self the same rights as the U.S.A. has asserted to determine for
itself how best to protect its vital interests," the note went on to
document all the U.S. unilateral assertions of jurisdiction beyond
the three mile territorial sea. Included among these references
were the U.S. 1966 contiguous fishing zone, the Truman Proclama-
tion of 1945, and nuclear testing on the high seas. Moreover, the
note aired Canadian grievances over the fact that its "extensive and
vigorous multilateral campaign" to secure agreement on a terri-
torial sea breadth in the early 1960's "failed because the U.S.A. ul-
timately declined to participate in them."4 1
Asserting its "overriding right of self-defense" to protect its ma-
38. Bill C-202, April 8, 1970 (first reading), 28th Parl., 2d Sess. 18-19
(1969-70).
39. J.A. Beesley, Rights and Responsibilities of Arctic Coastal States:
The Canadian View, 3 J. MamTnmm L. & CoM. 7 (October 1971).
40. U.S. Dep't of State Press Release No. 121 (April 15, 1970); N.Y. Times,
April 16, 1970, § 1, at 6, col. 1.
41. Summary of Canadian Note Handed to the United States Government
on April 16, 1970, Commons Debates, April 17, 1970, at 6027 if.
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rine environment, the Canadian Government rejected the notion of
participating in any international conference on the Arctic which
would deal with "questions falling wholly within Canadian domes-
tic jurisdiction." Canada rejected "any suggestion that the North-
west Passage is ... an international strait," and asserted that "Can-
ada's sovereignty over the islands of the Arctic Archipelago is not,
of course, an issue." More importantly, however, the Trudeau gov-
ernment placed reservations on Canada's acceptance of the compul-
sory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in "disputes
arising out of or concerning jurisdiction or rights claimed or exer-
cised by Canada in respect of the conservation, management or ex-
ploitation of the living resources of the sea, or in respect of the
prevention or control of pollution or contamination of the marine
environment in marine areas adjacent to the coast of Canada. '42
Although the governmental interactions of 1970 were complex,
the policy outcome was clear. The United States and Canada
emerged from the year 1970 with law of the sea attitudes and poli-
cies pointing in opposite directions. All levels of the governments
had been involved in the confrontation-including President Nixon
and Prime Minister Trudeau 43-and any retraction would thereafter
prove difficult, if not impossible. The landmarks of the policy di-
vergence included, on the Canadian side, legislation on Arctic pollu-
tion, territorial sea and fishing zones introduced in April, 1970 and,
on the U.S. side, the President's policy statement of May, 1970 and
its subsequent elaboration in the August, 1970 U.S. Draft Treaty
on the Seabed.
Faced with Canada's refusal to negotiate its claims to offshore
jurisdiction bilaterally or regionally or to submit them to the Inter-
national Court, the single arena remaining for a U.S.-Canadian pol-
icy confrontation was the U.N. Seabed Committee. Within this for-
um, Canada's jurisdictional claim was simply a variation on coastal
State extensions occurring elsewhere in the world. Indeed, Cana-
dian actions were no doubt taken with the knowledge that they
might be "sold" to other U.N. members. Of all coastal State exten-
sions, however, Canada's was the most alarming to the United
42. Text of reservation in 1970 CANADIAN YEAiwoo or IwTmwA OONAL
LAw 34; United Nations Press Release, L/T/587:Rev. 1 (April 9, 1970).
43. John Best, Nixron Was so Angry He Refused Trudeal's Call, Globe
and Mail (Toronto), August 25, 1973, at 7.
States Government and particularly to the Navy."4
The extent to which the -availability of the United Nations Sea-
bed Committee as a negotiating forum evoked or restrained develop-
ments in Canadian-American transnational relations in law of the
sea is ambiguous. Perhaps it stimulated the proliferation of na-
tional offshore claims. Certainly it served the U.S. as a court of
last resort in 1970. In so doing, of course, the U.N. Seabed Committee
contributed to linking fisheries, territorial sea and straits issues
with the deliberations on the ocean floor. Since 1967, negotiations
relating to ocean issues had been handled on two separate tracks.
While the U.N. Seabed Committee was heatedly debating the dis-
position of resources of the ocean floor, the maritime powers were
quietly discussing with other nations the possibility of international
agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea, straits, and fish-
eries. As in 1958 and 1960, the U.S. wanted universal agreement
on the territorial sea breadth and was prepared by 1970 to openly
support a twelve mile territorial sea if freedom of transit through
and over all international straits were guaranteed. To diffuse
coastal State opposition, the U.S. had combined this proposal with
a policy of preferential fishing rights for coastal States.
As Canada's Spring, 1970 legislation made -abundantly clear, lim-
ited coastal State rights to fisheries did not suffice to deflate pres-
sure building in favor of coastal State extensions. In response to
the Canadian legislation and other coastal State claims, the U.S.
offered far reaching resource and revenue concessions in exchange
for navigational mobility. On May 23, 1970, the President called
for coastal State renunciation of claims to seabed resources beyond
the depth of 200 meters and for the establishment beyond this point
of an international regime to govern seabed resource exploitation."
Beyond the 200 meter depth contour the coastal State would have
limited rights to manage resource exploitation to the outer edge
of the continental margin and revenues from that area would be
shared with the international community.
The intent of this policy, and of its subsequent elaboration in a
Draft Seabed Treaty in August, 1970, was to forestall further uni-
lateral extensions of jurisdiction. The revenue sharing aspects
were certainly calculated to garner the support of developing land-
44. The Canadian legislation "provided that naval vessels and other ships
owned by foreign governments may be exempted from the application of
Canadian anti-pollution regulations, if the ships in question substantially
met Canadian standards." 1970 CAN'IA YEAnsooc Op INTEmRATxONAL
LAW 34; United Nations Press Release, L/T/587/Rev. 1 (April 9, 1970).
45. For the background to this decision, see Hollic, Seabeds Mace
Strange Politics, FonEIGN PowcIr, No. 9, Winter 1972-73.
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locked or shelf-locked States.4" An unintended effect of the U.S.
Draft Treaty, however, was to contribute to pressure for combining
all of the law of the sea issues in a single negotiating conference.
While the U.S. was concerned to restrict the negotiating trade-offs
by handling seabed issues in a conference separate from one con-
cerning the territorial sea, straits and fisheries, the U.S. Draft
Treaty belied that argument. In December, 1970, the United Na-
tions voted to convene a single conference on all-law of the sea
issues in 1973. The trade-offs would henceforth be between coastal
and maritime interests across the range of ocean issues.
U.S.-Canadian differences over offshore jurisdiction played a
large role in defining the negotiating parameters in the 1970 Seabed
Committee. The United States stressed its global maritime inter-
ests and indicated that it might mortgage offshore resources to that
purpose. Canada, on the other hand, concentrated on protecting its
ample submerged lands and offshore resources from "giveaways"
to the international community.
Since 1970, there have been modifications in both policies. In re-
sponse to strong domestic as well -as international pressure, the U.S.
has upgraded the priority accorded to coastal fisheries and petro-
leum interests. And Canada, or at least its Department of Trans-
port, has indicated its interest in maintaining the principle of free-
dom of navigation to the greatest practical extent.47 Additionally,
in response to trends in the international negotiations, Canada and
the United States have tried to accommodate their positions to those
favoring a 200-mile economic zone and have indicated a willingness
to consider revenue sharing in areas beyond the zone. These shifts
in policy since 1970 can be more fully explained by examining the
processes leading to LOS decisions in both capitals.
V. DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES: OTTAWA
AND WASHINGTON
While Canadian and American policies in present law of the sea
negotiations reflect general coastal and maritime interests of each
46. Ratiner, United States Ocean Policy: An Analysis, 2 J. MAnurnvm L.
& Com. 225 (January 1971).
SC.II/L.4 (1971).
CommERcE, January 1971.
47. Jean Marchand, Minister of Transport, before Canada, Standing Com-
mittee on External Affairs and National Defence (House of Commons),
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS Am EVIDENcE No. 26, at 7 (Dec. 4, 1973).
country as well as the past decade of LOS relations, they also reflect
the decision-making processes within each government in the larger
context of an international lawmaking exercise. General character-
istics of the processes have been similar on both sides of the border.
A large number of agencies are involved in the policy process be-
cause law of the sea negotiations touch on a gamut of interests from
resource to national security considerations. Interagency groups
were established to deal with law of the sea and primary responsi-
bility for leadership or coordination of these diverse interests fell
initially to the legal divisions in the foreign affairs departments
of both governments. Reporting to the top officials in each govern-
ment has generally coincided with the sessions of the Seabed Com-
mittee and the Law of the Sea Conference. The guidelines which
were laid down in 1970 provided the thrust of policy to the end
of 1973, but since then new considerations have entered the policy
calculations of both governments.
The differences in the decision-making processes are more inter-
esting .than the sinliarities and account, to some extent, for differ-
ing policy substance as well as style. Since 1970, law of the sea
policy in the United States has been the product of intensive nego-
tiations among evenly matched opposing domestic and bureaucratic
interests. Once agreed upon, portions of U.S. policy are reopened
or altered with utmost difficulty. Canadian policy, on the other
hand, has until recently reflected the overwhelming preponderance
of coastal interests. This has allowed the Canadian diplomat
greater flexibility in adapting national policy to coastal trends pre-
vailing in the international negotiations. It is too early to tell
whether navigational and mining interests will have a constraining
effect on Canada's fundamentally coastal orientation.
The initial consolidation of U.S. bureaucratic machinery for ocean
questions occurred in early 1970 as it became apparent that a wide
variety of ocean issues would be handled within the single forum
of the U.N. Seabed Committee. Three agencies-State, Defense and
Interior-were aotive in LOS and represented on the U.S. delegation
to the Seabed Committee. Within these agencies, separate staffs
for continental shelf and seabed issues on the one hand, and straits,
territorial seas, and fisheries on the other, were merged. A central
policy body, the Inter-Agency Law of the Sea Task Force, was of-
ficially established in February, 1970 under the chairmanship of
John R. Stevenson, then Legal Advisor of the Department of State
and head of the U.S. Delegation. With Mr. Stevenson's departure
from government in 1973, John Norton Moore was appointed head
of the Interagency Task Force and head of a new law of the sea
office (D/LOS) in the Department of State. Mr. Stevenson became
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Ambassador and Special Representative of the President for the
Law of the Sea Conference with Mr. Moore as his deputy. The
Interagency Task Force which Mr. Moore heads includes among its
members representatives of all interested federal agencies and
bureaus: the Departments of State, Defense, Interior, Commerce,
Treasury, Justice, Transportation; the National Security Council;
the National Science Foundation; the Central Intelligence Agency;
the Office of Management and Budget; the U.S. Mission to the
United Nations; the Environmental Protection Agency; and the
Council on Environmental Quality. Except for the Office of Man-
agement and Budget, each of the agencies sent one or more rep-
resentatives to the preparatory sessions of the LOS Conference.
The U.S. sent a delegation of more than 100 to the Caracas session
of the Conference with all of the interested agencies amply repre-
sented.
Since 1932, Canada's Interdepartmental Committee on Territorial
Waters has been the expert body handling maritime issues. Agency
membership has fluctuated with government reorganization de-
pending upon the issue under consideration. With a change of
Cabinet Committees under the 1970 Trudeau reorganization, the
Interdepartmental Committee on Territorial Waters was reconsti-
tuted as the Interdepartmental Committee on Law of the Sea
(ICLOS)-a title designed to reflect the scope of ICLOS concerns
in the negotiations then underway at the U.N. The Legal Advisor
to the Department of External Affairs, J. Alan Beesley, chaired
ICLOS and served as head of the Canadian delegation to the U.N.
Seabed Conmmittee from 1969 through 1973. In 1973, Mr. E. G. Lee
became Legal Advisor and Chairman of ICLOS while Mr. Beesley,
although newly appointed Ambassador to Austria, continued as
Canada's senior law of the sea negotiator and deputy head of the
delegation. ICLOS includes among its members the Departments
of External Affairs; National Defence; Energy, Mines and Re-
sources; Environment; Industry, Trade and Commerce; Justice; In-
dian Affairs and Northern Development; Transport; and the Minis-
try of State for Science and Technology. Few of the ICLOS mem-
ber agencies sent representatives to the U.N. Seabed Committee.
Apart from External Affairs only the Department of Energy, Mines
and Resources has been consistently represented on the delegation
since 1968 and the Department of the Environment since its creation
in 1971. A representative from the Directorate of Sovereignty and
Planning of the Department of National Defence attended a 1972
session of the U.N. Seabed Committee while another was detailed
to External Affairs to serve as Secretary to the Canadian delegation
and Interdepartmental Committee. Canada fielded the second
largest delegation to the Caracas Conference (51) and though it in-
cluded participation by new agencies, it was weighted by repre-
sentatives from the Departments of the Environment (12), External
Affairs (9), Energy, Mines and Resources (3), with two or fewer
from six other departments or ministries.
The participation of U.S. Government departments and the rela-
tive lack of it by Canadian Government departments reflect dif-
ferent governmental systems as well as the relative strength of
divergent domestic interests vis-a-vis each nation's foreign affairs
office.4 8  Each U.S. Government agency has its own Legal Office
from which representatives to the Interagency Task Force and to
the U.S. Delegation may be chosen, unlike Canadian departments
which, with the exception of External Affairs, do not have legal
divisions. Because the law of the sea negotiations are concerned
with codification of international law, U.S. agency representatives
with legal expertise (as well as the technical expertise of their
respective departments) are able to wield greater influence than
their Canadian counterparts. They are able to participate directly
in international negotiations as well as in drafting of treaty arti-
cles.49 The active involvement of legal offices of non-foreign affairs
agencies in the U.S. has restricted the freedom of the State Depart-
ment Legal Advisor's Office and of its successor D/LOS. Though
it has garnered an increasingly important role since 1970, the State
Department has generally acted more as a compromiser of conflict-
ing agency interests than as a director of the policy process. The
difficulties of reconciling U.S. interests accounts for the frequency
48. The small size of the Canadian delegations and their cohesiveness
may be explained by what Mr. Beesley describes as "Canadian theory and
practice ... that one of the functions of a foreign service is to represent
the government and the country abroad, whether in bilateral negotiations
or multilateral negotiations. When the subjects are technical, requiring
special expertise, then other departments are either represented or, in some
cases, lead the delegation. In every case, however, every member of the
delegation is considered to represent the Canadian Government as a whole,
and not merely his particular ministry. Thus, External Affairs officers are
accustomed to reflect a composite governmental view rather than the posi-
tion the External Affairs Department may have taken in the inter-depart-
mental discussions leading to the development of the position." Letter from
Ambassador J. Alan Beesley, Canadian Embassy, Vienna, Austria, to Ann
L. Hollick, October 31, 1973.
49. The Defense Department has not been represented by its Legal Office
since 1972, but DOD has continued to wield a unique form of influence
based on strategic rather than legal expertise.
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of Interagency Task Force meetings-as often as once or twice a
week.
In contrast, Canada's Interdepartmental Committee on Law of
the Sea meets about six times a year, generally before and after
LOS negotiating sessions of the U.N. Except for the Department
of External Affairs, agencies of the Canadian government must rely
on the Department of Justice for legal counsel. In law of the sea
matters, however, the Justice Department has been primarily re-
stricted to federal-provincial jurisdictional disputes and had not
been represented on the Canadian delegation until 1972. Efforts
to absorb the External Affairs legal bureau into the Justice Depart-
ment operations have been strongly resisted.5 ' The Bureau of
Legal Affairs has given the Department of External Affairs a
commanding position among ICLOS agencies, and its Legal Opera-
tions Division 51 supplies the negotiating nucleus of the Canadian
delegation. Unlike the State Department's Office of the Legal Ad-
visor (as well as the office presently handling LOS), Canada's
Bureau of Legal Affairs is staffed largely by foreign service officers
with overseas experience. Rather than moving from private prac-
tice to government, Canadian legal officers are selected from career
civil servants. An example of the coordinating role played by the
relatively small group of legal and diplomatic experts in the Legal
Advisor's Office is the secondment of an official to the Department
of the Environment to coordinate that agency's activities in fisher-
ies and the marine environment.
In developing and negotiating national policy on law of the sea,
Canadian and American civil servants enjoy equal latitude although
different constraints in relation to the elected officials of the state
/provincial and federal governments. In both countries, reports to
elected officials in the Executive and Legislative branches generally
precede and follow sessions of the U.N. LOS negotiations. While
the U.S. civil servant may spend a substantial portion of his time
testifying before the many interested Congressional committees, his
Canadian counterpart divides his efforts between Cabinet commit-
50. Best, supra note 41.
51. The Legal Bureau has two divisions, Legal Advisory and Legal Oper-
ations, the first responsible for general expertise in international law and
the second for presenting the Canadian case at international conferences.
Within the Legal Operations Division, there are four sections, one of which
is law of the sea.
tees, Parliamentary committees and, on occasion, provincial govern-
ments.
Canada's ICLOS reports through the Secretary of State for Ex-
ternal Affairs to the Cabinet Committee for External Affairs and
National Defence, and secondarily to the Cabinet Committee on the
Environment.52 Due to the importance of law of the sea negotia-
tions for a variety of interests and departments, the process of
securing cabinet approval is not without its perils. As long as
policy proposals reflect the prevailing views of the government and
as long as agreement exists among civil servants of the several
departments or a preponderance thereof, the parliamentary system
offers substantial latitude to the bureaucrat. The operations of
ICLOS exemplify the type of policy influence that the civil servant
wields within the government. Unlike most elected officials, the
civil servant specializes in a set of issues and has the time to devote
to formulating and promoting policy proposals. In law of the sea,
draft instructions are prepared within the Legal Affairs Bureau and
then go to the full ICLOS membership for amendment and ap-
proval. The draft instructions are next sent to the Cabinet Com-
mittee on External Affairs and Defence where any problems that
cannot be resolved within ICLOS are ironed out among the minis-
ters. Due, perhaps, to the smaller size of the Canadian Govern-
ment, the Legal Advisor may meet with Cabinet committee minis-
ters on bilateral as well as multilateral LOS negotiations. Once
the Committee has agreed to the instructions, full Cabinet approval
is a formality.
Given the numerous responsibilities of Cabinet ministers and the
ability of Canadian law of the sea diplomats to satisfy the Parlia-
ment, if not all the agencies, the broad policy guidelines set out
in March, 1971, remained essentially unchanged through 1973.
Those on pollution simply instructed the diplomats to protect
coastal State interests. On a series of issues negotiated at the
Stockholm Conference, the London Dumping Conference, the
London IMCO Conference and the Seabed Committee, separate in-
structions were given. Prior to the New York and Caracas sessions
of the Law of the Sea Conference, the full Canadian position was
spelled out in a document tabled in the House of Commons on
November 2, 1973. A full review of this position was conducted
by the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National De-
fence.53 Were there sharp disagreement and equal political weight
52. CANADA, HousE or CommWomS STANDnG Com.nvrrns oN EXTERNAL AY-
wAns AND NATiONAL DEFmCE, AIniuT.Es or PROCEEDinGs AND EvWDEXC. No.
27, at 22 (Dec. 12, 1973).
53. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, cited in full
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among diverse Canadian interests, policy guidelines would no doubt
have been modified more frequently and would have been more
detailed.
Perhaps most important in understanding the Canadian policy
process in LOS is the national cohesion around a coastal policy
that was generated by the voyage of the Manhattan in 1969, the
implicit denial of Canadian jurisdiction and the resulting Canadian
legislation in Spring, 1970. Since then, the Department of Trans-
port, the Department of National Defence and the Ministry of
Science and Science Technology54 have experienced difficulties
when their policy preferences have run counter to the coastal State
orientation of Canada's law of the sea policy. They have been re-
minded that the 1970 legislation was the only bill to receive the
unanimous support of the Parliament. Only a substantial increase
in the size and prestige of Canadian merchant shipping or the re-
vival of distant military concerns might shift the Canadian position
toward greater emphasis on navigational freedoms. Such a drama-
tic change, however, is unlikely to occur before the Third U.N. Con-
ference on Law of the Sea is well over. In the meantime, coastal
interests will doubtless prevail.
In the United States, law of the sea policymakers are subject to
a different set of pressures and constraints in formulating and nego-
tiating policy. The decision process in development of U.S. LOS
policy has been formally within the National Security Council sys-
tem. Prior to each session of the U.N. negotiations, the Interagency
Task Force spends several months preparing draft instructions
which are then transmitted to the White House for approval. There,
difficulties have arisen in pushing the instructions through White
House channels that are typically engulfed with more pressing is-
in CANADA, HousE OF CoimnoNs STANDING ColImnrrEEa ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
AND NATIONAL DEFEc, Mn1TEs OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENcE No. 22
(Nov. 6, 1973). Other Proceedings: No. 23, November 15, 1973; No. 24, No-
vember 22, 1973; No. 25, November 30, 1973; No. 26, December 4, 1973; No.
27, December 12, 1973; No. 16, May 7, 1974.
54. The Ministry of Transport has a major input in the IMCO negotia-
tions while the Ministry of Science and Technology has reportedly made
a major input in LOS. See also Statement of the Minister of Transport,
CANADA, HousE OF CoiVuoNs STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRs
AND NATIONAL DEFENC, MINUTES OF PROcEEDINGs AND EVIDENCE No. 26
(Dec. 4, 1973); Canadian Chamber of Shipping "Appendix 0, AIuTs OF
PRocEEDiNGS A EVIDEN CE No. 16 (May 7, 1974).
sues. As a result the instructions (in the form of National Security
Decision Memoranda [NSDM's]) have at times reached the U.S.
delegation several weeks after the start of a negotiating session.
Delays have also been caused at an earlier stage in the policy proc-
ess by disputes among the agencies comprising the Task Force.
When this occurred in 1970, 1972 and 1973, the dispute was taken
to the Under Secretary's Committee where compromises were
sought. If the agencies in disagreement did not accept the com-
promise formulations, the dispute went to the White House and on
occasion to the President for a decision. As a result of these diver-
gent U.S. interests, even routine draft instructions forwarded to
the White House by the Interagency Task Force for approval reflect
tenuous compromises among all agencies. The resulting National
Security Decision Memoranda are necessarily quite specific on
matters under contention. The active participation of many U.S.
agencies on the Delegation to the Conference assures that the in-
structions are not overstepped in the negotiating process.
Although the general American public is not as informed about
national law of the sea policies as is the Canadian public, private
American interests have followed the negotiations quite closely
since 1970. In response to strong industry pressure, the relationship
of these interests to the U.S. Government was formalized in early
1972 with the creation of an Advisory Committee on the Law of
the Sea. Members from each of its eight subcommittees-petro-
leum, hard minerals, international law and relations, marine
science, fisheries, international finaice and taxation, marine en-
vironment and maritime industries-are represented on the U.S.
delegation to the Seabed Committee. In addition to this formalized
watchdog role and the exertion of pressure in Congress, interest
groups make their wishes felt directly on government officials who
tend to move into and out of private business more frequently than
Canadian lawyers. Like his Canadian counterpart, the American
civil servant enjoys a special expertise derived from concentrating
on the technicalities of oceans policy. While that expertise be-
stowed a certain freedom on a small group of U.S. officials through
1970, the heightened activism and expertise of many private inter-
ests and agencies has since reduced their latitude. The effect on
policy has been a trend toward a greater balance between the vari-
ous U.S. coastal and maritime interests.
The diversity of U.S. interests and of lines of influence makes
the negotiation of a single national policy as difficult if not more
difficult than negotiating the policy internationally. Because a
position may be hammered out at the last minute, the U.S. finds
it difficult to coordinate with or even to give advance notice tQ
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other governments of policies that it plans to support. A prime
example of this problem in U.S.-Canadian relations was the tabling
of the U.S. Draft Treaty on the Seabed Regime in August, 1970.
Bitterly fought within the U.S. Government, the Draft Treaty was
pressed through an interagency controversy at the last moment
and was forwarded to the Canadian Government only three days
before officially released. The Canadians were dismayed, particu-
larly with the provisions for international jurisdiction over the
continental shelf beyond a depth of 200 meters, and resented the
lack of consultation before its presentation. The mode of present-
ing it to the Canadian Government, as much as its contents, did
not enhance cooperative relations in law of the sea.
VI. TRANSNATIONAL SYSTEMS
Despite the difficulties posed for intergovernmental cooperation
by the U.S. arriving at last minute decisions, transnational as well
as transgovernmental LOS relations between the U.S. and Canada
might proceed unaffected. As in 1958 or 1960, Canada's Department
of National Defence might consult with the U.S. Defense Depart-
ment on law of the sea matters of mutual concern. Scientists in
both countries might cooperate in the conduct of offshore marine
research. Or the mining companies and the relevant government
departments on both sides of the border might harmonize their
proposals on a regime for deep seabed mining. Such contacts have
occurred but were reduced by the events of 1970 and are presently
restricted to non-governmental, informal links.
The full U.S. and Canadian delegations meet bilaterally about
once a year. These official intergovernmental consultations in-
creased in number before Canada passed its 1970 legislation, stopped
for a period, and have resumed since. Representatives of the foreign
offices have met with officials of other agencies in negotiating fish-
eries questions and at the Stockholm and IMCO Conferences. In
law of the sea, the pattern of informal consultation has been be-
tween representatives of the maritime powers such as the U.S., the
U.S.S.R., Japan and certain European nations. For its part, the
Canadian delegation maintains regular informal contact with Aus-
tralia, Norway, New Zealand, Iceland and a number of other middle
power coastal nations. It is to these countries, with substantial
coastal interests, that Canada has turned for support since 1970.
The records of the 1968 and 1969 meetings of the U.N. Seabed
Committee show a now surprising degree of coordination and even
cooperation between U.S. and Canadian delegates. Representatives
of both countries to the Economic and Technical Subcommittee (the
predecessor of Subcommittee I of the Seabed Committee and the
First Committee of the Law of the Sea Conference) shared with
their British and Australian colleagues training in the disciplines
of geology and geography. Within this highly politicized forum of
legally trained delegates, a comfortable professional relationship de-
veloped-in the case of Canada and the U.S. between officials of
the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources and of the Inte-
rior Department respectively.55 The major efforts of the delegates
of Canada, the U.S., Britain and Australia in 1968 and 1969 were
directed toward injecting hard data into the Subcommittee's discus-
sions. To this end, speeches were orchestrated to raise the level
of understanding of geological realities, the state of mining tech-
nology, alternative types of mining systems, the concerns and bene-
fits of marine science and the like.
The disappearance in 1970 of such coordinated efforts is traceable
to a number of factors. Within the United Nations the stage of
discussion and exchange of technical information was superseded
in 1970 by the stage of political bargaining and definition of trade-
offs. At the same time, U.S.-Canadian policies parted ways over
Canadian offshore claims and the U.S. counter proposal for re-
nouncing claims to resources of the continental margin beyond the
200 meter isobath. Although the Interior Department had lost
ground within the U.S. Government, Canada's Department of
Energy, Mines and Resources played an increasing role in policy
counsels. While Canada's global naval interests were being forced
to contract their concerns from NATO defense to sovereignty and
domestic police functions, in Canadian eyes, "the Admirals had
taken over" United States policy. With the military agency ascend-
ant in the United States and the resource and environment agencies
ascendant in Canada, earlier lines of informal communication
quickly eroded.
It is instructive to note the agency representation on the U.S.
and Canadian delegations as it has changed since 1968. The only
Canadian departanents represented in 1968 and 1969 were the De-
55. Indeed, many technical provisions of the U.S. Draft Treaty appear
to be closely modeled on the Canadian system and can be traced to ex-
changes within the Economic and Technical Working Group. See for in-
stance, text of statements of D.G. Crosby in the Economic and Technical
Subcommittee of the U.N. Seabed Committee on March 21, 1969 and March
13, 1970.
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partments of External Affairs and Energy, Mines and Resources.
During the same years, U.S. agency participation included the De-
partments of State, Defense and the Interior. Since 1970, the only
new agency regularly participating on the Canadian delegation has
been the Department of the Environment, created in 19-71. As
noted above, DND participation has been limited primarily to de-
tailing an officer to the LOS Division of the Legal Bureau to serve
as secretary to ICLOS and the Seabed Committee Delegation. Al-
though they are members of ICLOS, departments with distant
water interests were not represented at meetings of the Seabed
Committee. The Departments of Transport and of National De-
fence and the Ministry of State for Science and Technology sent
one representative each to ihe Caracas session. The contrast with
the sizeable and diversified U.S. agency participation is striking.
Since 1970, new members of the U.S. delegation have come from
the Departments of Commerce, Treasury, Transportation, the Na-
tional Science Foundation and the Environmental Protection
Agency and they have been present in large numbers at the interna-
tional negotiations.
The asymmetry in size and composition of the respective delega-
tions accounts to some extent for the lack of transgovernmental
interactions during meetings of the Seabed Committee. Instead,
there have developed multi-nation semi-institutionalized interest
group contacts within the framework of the law of the sea negotia-
tions. The earliest group to organize were the fishery experts who
in effect set the pattern of weekly luncheon meetings for subse-
quent groups. Participants were selected on the basis of expertise,
not country representation, and varied from week to week. The
next group to be created after the "Fish Hook Luncheon Club" was
the "Seabed Dredge and Drill Club" in 1972. Membership included
petroleum and hard minerals geologists and engineers. Similar
luncheon groups have been formed more recently for naval-military
interests ("The Peacekeepers Group") and for marine science inter-
ests. The policy impact of these regularized transnational meetings
is difficult to determine. Undoubtedly they provide a useful oppor-
tunity for delegates and private experts from as many as 30 coun-
tries to exchange views with at least a common basis of technical
expertise. They do not, however, provide a forum for U.S.-Cana-
dian interest group exchanges. U.S. participation at these luncheon
meetings has included private industry representatives advising the
delegation while Canadian private sector representatives did not at-
tend the international negotiations until the Caracas meeting.
The absence until recently of direct private interest participation
on the Canadian delegation and the concomitant reduction of trans-
national links can be traced to several factors. A paramount con-
sideration has been the politicization of law of the sea issues with
the 1970 legislation. Equally important is the fact that Canada's
vocal coastal interest groups have been largely satisfied with the
thrust of official policy. Canadian law of the sea interests do not
all point in the same direction but it has been the civil servants
in the Legal Bureau of the External Affairs Department that have
balanced the several considerations--not the competition of inter-
est groups. These officials have maintained a cohesive coastal ori-
ented policy that has in turn enhanced the ability of the Canadian
delegation to play a leadership role in the international negotia-
tions.
While U.S. private sector interests have pursued policy goals
through representatives in a number of agencies (i.e., petroleum
and hard minerals through the Interior and Treasury Departments,
or science through the National Science Foundation and the State
Department's Coordinator of Ocean Affairs) the policy process in
Ottawa is so centralized that representations must be directed to
the key departments of External Affairs, Environment, and Energy,
Mines and Resources. Due in part to the nature of the Canadian
economy, Canadian officials are able to keep private interests at
arms length. Foreign ownership of major industries is substantial
-i.e., 99 percent of oil refinery capacity in 1969 or 85 percent of
primary smelting.56 Consequently, the interest of a particular in-
dustry rarely seems to be equated with the national interest. On
the contrary, it is generally suspect. Whereas in the United States,
companies such as Exxon, Mobil, Texaco and Shell might receive
a favorable hearing within several agencies of the Government,
their Canadian affiliates do not. The coincidence between the oil
industry position on coastal State offshore jurisdiotion and that of
the Canadian Government does not extend to the industry position
on security of investnent, compulsory settlement of disputes and
protection of the marine environment. Canadian nationalism in
conjunction with the multinational connections of the oil industry
has left the civil servant free to formulate a national policy inde-
pendent of industry interests.
Similarly, where the Canadian Government closely regulates the
56. Peter Newman, Why Canada Wants Texas Gulf, N.Y. Times, August
5, 1973, § 3, at 3, col. 4.
[VOL. 12: 518, 1975] U.S. and Canadian Policy Processes
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
activities of hard mineral mining industries, the United States does
not. Because the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources is
concerned with the effect on Canadian mineral prices and employ-
ment levels, it does not wish to encourage unregulated seabed min-
erals exploitation. While International Nickel Company, Noranda
and other Canadian companies are as interested in nodule mining
as American firms, until recently they have maintained silence on
the subject and have had little say in the Canadian position on the
international seabed regime. INCO has invested $12 million in
ocean mining technology but reportedly "with the intent of protect-




Noranda has participated in a seabed research and development
project "to sustain its position as one of the world's major producers
and exporters of copper." Noranda takes issue with the official
government position on the grounds that "[i]t would be short
sighted to attempt to deny the development of a new source of
needed resource in order to try and protect an existing resource."58
American firms, on the other hand, have entered the governmental
policy process more directly. While Hughes's Summa Corporation
is proceeding with its activities in disregard of international delib-
erations, Deep Sea Ventures and Kennecott Copper have pressed
for favorable legislation in both the Congress and the Executive
branch. Kennecott and Deep Sea Ventures are said to have in-
vested about $20 million each and Summa Corporation in the vicin-
ity of $100 million in ocean mining. In November, 1974, Deep Sea
Ventures laid claim to a Pacific Ocean mining site and notified the
Secretary of State accordingly. 59 The transnational interactions of
the mining companies are reportedly extensive but cannot be docu-
mented. Apparently INCO has cooperated to a limited degree in
pushing ocean mining legislation but relations with U.S. companies
have at times been strained.60
57. Barry Newman, Mysterious Nodules at Bottom of Oceans May Yield
a Treasure, Wall Street Journal, September 21, 1973, at 1.
58. Statement of Noranda Mines Limited, CANADA, HousE OF COMMONS
STANING ColvnvlxrrnE oN EXTRNAL AFAIS AN NATIONAL DEFENCE, MIN-
UTES OF PROCEEDInGS Am EvIENCE No. 16, at 35 (May 7, 1974).
59. Deepsea Ventures, Inc., Notice of Discovery and Claim of Exclusive
Mining Rights, and Request for Diplomatic Protection and Protection of In-
vestment by Deepsea Ventures, Inc., filed with the Secretary of State of
the United States of America, November 15, 1974.
60. According to the Wall Street Journal a U.S. corporate executive has
described INCO as "the man who comes to the wife-swapping party without
his wife."
The marine science interest in narrow boundaries can be disre-
garded in Canada, not because of foreign domination but simply
because it is weak. Government officials find the scientific estab-
lishment to be unresponsive to overriding policy concerns and must,
therefore, keep a wary eye on it. In one interesting case, transna-
tional scientific relations with the U.S. evoked a transgovernmental
Canadian response and ultimately an intergovernmental protest.
Upon reading the November, 1969 issue of Geotimes,61 a senior of-
ficial of the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources discovered
that the Glomar Challenger operating under the Deep Sea Drilling
Project would be conducting two drilling operations on Canada's
continental margin, the most controversial one located 150 miles
southeast of Halifax and 140 miles southwest of Sable Island. 2
Upon further inquiry it was learned that the sites had been sug-
gested by a Canadian scientist cooperating in the Joint Oceano-
graphic Institutions Deep Earth Sampling Program (JOIDES).
Not only was the off-Halifax site selected because of the existence
of oil related structures, but it had already been leased to Shell Oil.
In response to this information, a representative from Canada's De-
partment of Energy, Mines and Resources made a statement to the
U.N. Seabed Committee indicating that "a drilling programme
would not be allowed to proceed on Canada's continental margin,
whether it be with scientific or commercial intent, without assur-
ance that adequate pollution control equipment and procedures
were to be utilized."'63 In response to this speech and at the sugges-
tion of the Interior Department's representative on the U.S. delega-
tion to the Seabed Committee, the Chief Scientist of the Deep Sea
Drilling Project in NSF contacted the official from EMR. While
those discussions were underway, and upon the advice of EMR, the
Department of External Affairs made an official protest of the
drilling to the State Department through its Ambassador in
Washington.
Although the Canadian case for prohibiting the drilling rested
overtly on the grounds of the Glomar Challenger's inability to
handle blowouts, the underlying issue was that of sovereignty.
Denying Canada's right to assert jurisdiction over an area as deep
as 2,340 meters and over a hundred miles from shore, the State
Department advised NSF not to fill out the Canadian offshore drill-
ing notices. The issue was ultimately resolved between the EMR
61. Deep Sea Drilling Project Extended, GEoTmEs, November 1969, at 17.
62. Canada Apprehensive Over C.S. Program Seeking Ocean-Floor Drill-
ing Sites, The Globe and Mail, May 28, 1970.
63. Statement of D.G. Crosby in the Economic and Technical Subcom-
mittee of the U.N. Seabed Committee, March 13, 1970, at 6.
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and NSF officials by a compromise in which it was agreed that
the Project would not drill off Halifax and the Canadian Govern-
ment would overlook the drilling off Newfoundland." The lesson
of that experience for Canadian science has clearly been that it
must not swim against the tide of government policy. It, like other
ocean interests, must have government sanction of its international
dealings.
The fisheries policies of Canada and the United States are similar
in many respects0 5 due to comparable circumstances in both coun-
tries. The fisheries offshore both nations are some of the most
valuable in the world and until their depletion by distant fishing
nations, supported a sizeable fishing community. Distant water
fleets ,operate out of the U.S. and Canada, although the Canadian
fleet is far smaller than that of the U.S. To provide for these
domestic interests, both nations initially adopted the "species ap-
proach" within the U.N. Seabed Committee and both subsequently
adapted this to the concept of a 200-mile resource zone. In the
evolution of the species approach in both countries, domestic fac-
tors played a significant role. Its adaptation to a 200-mile zone
concept is attributable to the pressures of the international negotia-
tions.
Canada's fishery policy has since 1964 been aggressive in protect-
ing coastal fishing interests through the extension of exclusive fish-
eries jurisdiction. With the government's adoption of fishery clos-
ing lines extending Canada's fisheries jurisdiction, the highly vocal
fishing industry issued a statement of support for the official nego-
tiators. 66 Provincial fisheries ministers and industry have appar-
64. The Deep Sea Drilling Project has since made it official policy to
avoid structures that might contain gas pockets. Deep Sea Project, TAE Omr
AND GAS JounNAL, Nov. 2, 1970, at 120-22.
65. L.ILJ. Legault, Statement to the Fourth Governor's Conservation
Congress, December 12-15, 1971.
66. Whereas the Fisheries Council of Canada has felt in the past that
the Government of Canada did not place sufficient emphasis on
fisheries matters in the development and execution of international
affairs policies; and Whereas to a large extent this shortcoming is
now being corrected through extensions of fisheries jurisdiction;
negotiation of bilateral fisheries agreements and development of
principles of international law .. . and Whereas these activities
have been accompanied as they proceeded, by an increasing con-
sultation with the Canadian fishing industry; and Whereas an im-
pressive team of international fisheries experts and negotiators...
has been established in the Department of External Affairs. There-
fore be it resolved that the Government of Canada be urged to keep
ently continued to support the Government in its effort to achieve
recognition of resource jurisdiction at least to 200 miles if not out
to the edge of the continental margin.67 Canadian officials, there-
fore, encountered few difficulties when, in 1973, they accommodated
the species approach to the widely supported concept of a 200-mile
economic zone.0 8 The move to a 200-mile zone had the added ad-
vantage of enhancing Canadian influence with developing coastal
States.
Within the United States, fisheries policy through 1971 was deter-
mined by naval interests anxious to prevent the development of
a resource zone that might evolve into a zone of coastal State sov-
ereignty. This was evident in the 1970 U.S. proposal to offer pref-
erential fishing rights and a twelve mile territorial sea to coastal
States in exchange for freedom of transit through international
straits.69 Even when the species approach was first elaborated in
1971 by the fishing industry, it was introduced in conjunction with
territorial sea and straits provisions of U.S. policy.70 Since then,
coastal fisheries interests have grown consistently in strength. In
1972, the species concept was elaborated in the form of draft articles
with a greater stress than ever before on the management and en-
forcement rights of the coastal State. The U.S. move in 1974 to
a 200-mile exclusive economic zone with separate regimes for highly
migratory and anadromous species reflected not only the growing
strength of the coastal resource interests but the continued activism
of other segments of the U.S. fishing industry. Congressional pres-
sure for a unilateral extension of fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles
indicates a similar preoccupation with coastal resources.
7'1
Domestic interests and international considerations have played
a greater role in the evolution of U.S. and Canadian fisheries poli-
cies than have relations between the two countries. U.S.-Canadian
transgovernmental relations, however, become more significant in
this highly respected and qualified team together.., in order that
the necessary expertise and continuity may be maintained for the
critical developments which lie ahead in international fisheries and
international law of the sea.
Fisheries Council of Canada, 1972 Annual Meeting Resolution No. 23, Inter-
national Negotiations.
67. Fisheries Minister Remains Optimistic About Industry, The Guardian
(Charlottetown), November 1, 1973.
68. Draft Articles on Fisheries by Canada, India, Kenya and Sri Lanka,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.38 (1973).
69. U.S. Dep't of State, Press Release No. 64, 62 DE'T STATE BuLL.. 343
(1970).
70. 10 N LGAL MAmaALs 1018 (1971).
71. Draft Articles on the Breadth of the Territorial Sea, Straits and
Fisheries: Submitted by the United States of America, U.N, Doc. A/AC,138/
S.C.II/L.4. (1971).
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negotiations within regional fisheries organizations (such as the In-
ternational Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries). Allied
against the distant water fishing nations, Canadian and American
officials have coordinated actions in appropriate situations. In both
governments the negotiators include representatives of fisheries
agencies as well as the foreign affairs ministries.
The absence of a substantial number of transnational and trans-
governmental interactions in U.S.-Canadian law of the sea rela-
tions has several possible explanations. The centralization of de-
cision-making power in Canada's foreign 'affairs department has
been a major factor. The policy centralization was facilitated by
the polarization of law of the sea issues in Canada in 1970. That
such policy centralization has been viable indicates that the policies
pursued are satisfactory to most of Canada's indigenous interests.
Certainly, Canadian policy vis-a-vis extending fishing jurisdictions,
protecting the Arctic environment, and generally standing up to
the United States has struck responsive chords within the Canadian
public. In the case of those few domestic interests that are not
satisfied with official policy, the Canadian context of growing na-
tionalism limits the resort to transnational relations with United
States interests. Where a strong bureaucracy finds itself con-
fronted with a substantial number of foreign owned private inter-
ests, its judicious use of nationalist sentiment can ensure that policy
formulation remains in the hands of the civil servants.
VII. CONCLUSION
While U.S.-Canadian intergovernmental relations are continuing
as the Third LOS Conference progresses, the future of transnational
relations is less certain. The LOS policies of both countries have
drawn closer since the divergence of 1970 and may come even
nearer if the Conference continues over a long period of time.
With national policies less sharply divided, it is possible that trans-
national links will be more easily established between those groups
that are not entirely satisfied with the official policies of their
respective governments. In the short run, however, serious ob-
stacles exist to a reestablishment of relations as close as those of
1958 and 1960. The overall trend of Canadian nationalism and pol-
icy independence will doubtless persist. Although Canadian and
U.S. policies may be increasingly similar, the differences that re-
main will be stressed by Canadian officials. While Canada's ability
to exercise a leadership role among developing nations will continue
to decline, Canada will retain its close working relations with other
middle range coastal nations. The U.S. will continue its somewhat
isolated position in the negotiations and its limited affiliation with
other developed and maritime nations.
The conclusion of the Law of the Sea Conference will eliminate
an important forum for the assertion of a distinctive Canadian
policy and set of claims. The probable Conference outcome, how-
ever, will recognize most if not all of Canada's offshore claims. And
there will continue to be other international oceans organizations
in which remaining unsatisfied claims may still be advanced. The
achievement of most of Canada's policy goals may ultimately result
in a reduction of high level government involvement in law of the
sea and in the growth of transnational 'and informal law of the
sea relations between the two countries.
